Keynes: Useful Economics for the World Economy. PETER TEMIN AND DAVID VINES. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 117, $24.95.

We live in a world where John Maynard Keynes has largely influenced the education of policymakers and the content of the policies they crafted in the major economies. The premise by the end of the twentieth century became that to know Keynesian macroeconomic thought meant having an ability to devise the best policies to meet economic goals. In *Keynes: Useful Economics for the World Economy*, Peter Temin and David Vines use this aforementioned premise and a belief that Keynesian thought has been forgotten or neglected more recently in order to carve out an opportunity. An opportunity to teach the reader the basics of Keynesian thought, outline the intellectual insights of David Hume and Alfred Marshall that later informed Keynes, describe the episodic embrace and rejection of Keynes as the twentieth century proceeded, and apply Keynesian thought to economies after the 2008 financial crisis.

Their discussion begins with the statement that a country whose policymakers follow the tenets of Keynesian macroeconomic theory achieve economic growth. As proof of this they cite the fact that the United States economy from the late 1940s to the late 1960s and then again from the 1980s until 2008 represented twin golden ages of economic growth that were both fueled by Keynesian inspired policies. The economic problems experienced after the financial crisis have been caused, to some extent, by policymakers who may claim to follow Keynesian policies but contradict this by failing to consider the global consequences of their actions and the potential interactions among countries. Temin and Vines posit that the lackluster economic performance after the crisis could be resolved if policymakers remembered the global aspects of Keynesian macroeconomic thought.

The authors wrote this book not for economists but for policymakers who have some basic familiarity with economics. This text is organized into three parts. In the first three chapters the authors provide an overview of economic thought in a historical context by tracing back the intellectual heritage of Keynesian thought to David Hume and Alfred Marshall and the interactions (and frustrations) of Keynes first at Versailles at the conclusion of World War I and later with the Macmillan Committee after the 1929 stock market crash. This historical discussion highlights the revolutionary nature of the Keynesian thought in the early twentieth century and emphasizes the global perspective that Keynes considered so important in economic theory. In the second part of the text covered by chapters 4-8 the reader is presented with the basics of Keynesian macroeconomic theory as developed by Keynes, the IS/LM Keynesian model developed by John Hicks, the Swan diagram developed by Trevor Swan, and the policy prescriptions suggested by Keynes in a post-war world. For a trained economist, these chapters provide insufficient detail to the otherwise complicated models and concepts they revel in. The authors explicitly state in the preface that this book is not intended for economists but instead for policymakers who can make the world better by understanding Keynesian theory. The text concludes in part three (chapters 9 and 10) with a discussion of the role of Keynes in the Bretton Woods agreement and the International Monetary Fund institutional structure. The intent of this discussion is that readers appreciate the influence Keynes had on the twentieth century and how the neglect of Keynes in policy has contributed to lackluster and unstable economic growth more recently.

For the non-economist, this text provides a valuable trifecta of history, economic theory, and policy. Although the professional economist reading the text may find the economic theory discussion frustratingly simplified, the historical discussion is something not typically encountered in macroeconomic theory textbooks and makes reading the text a worthwhile investment of the economist's time. Both the non-economist and economist however would have benefited from a significantly longer discussion of how policies and institutional reactions changed after the 2008 financial crisis. In just 10 pages the authors discuss the international paradox of thrift as it applied to economies in the closing decades of the twentieth century and during and immediately after the financial crisis. Consequently, frustration understandably emerges from the forward-thinking policymaker who has essentially worked through 90% of the text to be left with a rather short critique of policies adopted after the financial crisis and of what should be done in the future.

The text concludes with a hope that policymakers will be able to resolve international tensions more easily than was in the case in the interwar period by creating the conditions for sustainable economic prosperity in a global context. Yet, the reader with some basic understanding of economic performance before and after the crisis may be surprised of the lack of discussion in the text of the recent transition from convergence to divergence in global growth rates. Leading up to the crisis, the major and minor economies in the world were largely in sync and growing strongly at roughly similar rates. Once the crisis occurred, the same major and minor economics declined together. This global business cycle and the synchronized movements of economics reflected, to some extent, the long-term vision of Keynes where global institutions coordinated growth and beggar-thy-neighbor policies were limited in their effect. Years after the crisis, a divergence has emerged with the United States growing three times faster than Germany and India growing annually at 8% while Russia faces the prospects of a deep recession. The return of country-wide business cycles signals a lack of coordination and an incentive for policy makers to treat trading partners with disdain if it means boosting domestic growth of Gross Domestic Product.

This transition from convergence to divergence in global growth rates bears mentioning when discussing the consequences of us all being Keynesians now. Is it the case that divergence in growth rates reflects policymakers forgetting Keynesian theory? And if the answer to that question is in the affirmative, doesn't the presence of this divergence pose problems for capital flows and international cooperation? Or is it the case that the return of divergence highlights the limits of Keynesian theory? And if the answer to that question is in the affirmative, could it be said that policymakers won't resolve problems by following Keynesian theory more closely but rather fuel the problems? Temin and Vines in this text artfully present one side of this debate. What is needed now is someone to take up the other side of this debate as effectively as Temin and Vines.

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Making in America: From Innovation to Market. SUZANNE BERGER. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 250. $24.95.

Suzanne Berger provides a detailed account of how innovation flows from ideas into production and the implications for the manufacturing sector in the United States and abroad. Her analysis is primarily based upon interviews and surveys of managers in U.S. manufacturing